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Abstract
The number of minimal cut sets (m.c,s.) of very complex and highly inter-
7
connected fault trees can become extremely large (e.g. more than 10 ). In
this case the usual analytical approach of dissecting the fault tree TOP vari-
able into m.c.s. is not only computationally prohibitively expensive, but al-
so meaningless because it does not offer any synthetic overview of system be-
havior. The method proposed in this paper overcomes the deficiencies of the ana-
lytical method. It is shown that, by applying boolean algebra with restricted
variables (b.a.w,r,v.), the concept of fault tree modularization can be straight-
forwardly extended from a single gate to a set of gates. Thus, large fault trees
are divided into smaller fault trees (modules), which are connected to each
other according to a simple scherne. This scheme is represented by a block dia-
gram in which each block is a module. The modules are analyzed separately by
the m,c,s. method, and the results are combined according to the block diagram
connections to calculate the occurrence probability of the TOP event. The method
allows the calculation of very large fault trees in a short time and offers a
synthetic overview of system behavior through the block diagram, Numerical exam-
pIes are also included. Calculation8 have been carried out by using the com-
puter code MUSTAMO, which 18 ba8ed on the theory developed in this paper.
Boolesche Algebra mit beschränkten Variablen als Mittel zur
Feh lerb aum-Modulari sierung
Kurzfassung
Die Anzahl der Minimalschnitte sehr komplexer und stark vermaschter
Fehlerbäume kann extrem groß werden (beispielsweise mehr als 107).
Für diesen Fall ist das übliche analytische Verfahren der Zerlegung
der TOP-Variablen des Fehlerbaums in Minimalschnitte sowohl rechen-
technisch prohibitiv teuer, als auch sinnlos, weil es keinen Uberblick
über das Systernverhalten liefert. Mit der hier vorgeschlagenen Metho-
de werden diese Mängel der analytischen Methode überwunden. Es wird
gezeigt, daß durch Einsatz der Booleschen Algebra mit beschränkten
Variablen das Konzept der Fehlerbaum-Modularisierung von einem ein-
zelnen Gatter ohne weiteres auf eine Menge von Gattern erweitert
werden kann. Große Fehlerbäume werden dadurch in kleinere Fehlerbäume
(Module) aufgeteilt, die nach einem einfachen Schema miteinander ver-
knüpft sind. Dieses Schema wird durch ein Blockdiagramm dargestellt,
in dem jeder Block ein Modul ist. Die Module werden nach der Methode
der Minimalschnitte einzeln analysiert, und die Ergebnisse werden
aufgrund der Verknüpfungen des Blockdiagramms zusammengefaßt, um
die Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeit des TOP-Ereignisses zu berechnen. Die
Methode erlaubt die Auswertung von sehr großen Fehlerbäumen in kurzer
Zeit und liefert über das Blockdiagramm einen Uberblick über das Sys-
ternverhalten. Die Methode wird auch an Hand von numerischen Beispie-
len erläutert. Die Berechnungen wurden mit Hilfe des Rechenprogrammes
MUSTAMO durchgeführt, das auf der in diesem Bericht beschriebenen Theorie
basiert.
Preface
The "ad hoc," european expert working group in reliability during their
11th meeting held at Ispra (Italy) on 15th and 16th October 1980 recommended
to investigate the use of boolean algebra with restricted variables in future
computer programs for fault tree analysis.
Following this recommendation a meeting was held at Karlsruhe on 1st April
1981. The participants were Messers A. Cross and R. Matthews from the Safety
and Reliability Directorate, UKAEA (Warrington, Great Britain), Mr. A. Amendola
from the European Joint Research Center of Ispra (Italy), Mr. C.A. Clarotti
from the Comitato Ricerche Nucleari (Roma, Italy) and Messers L. Caldarola,
A. Wickenhäuser, H. Knuth and H. Schnauder from Kernforschungszentrum Karls-
ruhe (Federal Republic of Germany).
At the end of the meeting the participants issued the following state-
ment:
"In order to extend the current techniques of logical analysis to give a
more complete system representation, it seems advisable to use boolean al-
gebra with restricted variables (b.a.w.r.v.) in future computer programs
for fault tree analysis.
The advantages of b.a.w.r.v. over the traditional boolean algebra tech-
niques are as follows:
1. It handles components with more than two states.
2. It extends the concept of modules from that of a single gate to that
of a set of gates. This has the potential for handling fault trees
with large numbers of minimal cut sets. The extent of this potential
should be further investigated.
3. Because of the modularisation of the fault tree, the logical informa-
tion is presented in a more compact, understandable form. This is of
particular importance when the number of minimal cut sets is very large.
With reference to points 1 and 2 above, b.a.w.r.v. is the common language
which can be used,at the boolean level, in both fault tree analysis and
state analysis, thus allowing the combination of the two techniques in a
more manageable way. In addition there are no basic problems integrating
b.a.w.r.v. with computer aided fault tree construction, common mode ana-
lysis and quantitative analysis (analytical and/or simulation methods).
The development of these aspects should also be explored.
The above points are valid in all applications of fault tree analysis
such as risk analysis, design optimisation, on line diagnostics etcetera."
During the meeting the authors showed the applications of b.a.w.r.v. for fault
tree modularization. This paper is the authors presentation on the subject
at the meeting.
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INTRODUCTION
The evaluation of the occurrence probability of the top event of a
fault tree can be carried out by means of simulation methods (Monte Car -
10-type methods') or by means of ana1ytica1 methods.
Numerica1 simulation a1lows re1iability information to be obtained for
systems of a1most any degree of complexity. While this method provides
estimates it does not yield parametric relations. In addition, since the
fai1ure probability of a system is usua1ly very 10w, precise resu1ts can
be achieved on1y at the expense of very 10ng computationa1 times.
Ana1ytica1 methods give more insight and understanding because ex-
p1icit re1ationships are obtainab1e. The resu1ts are also more precise
because these methods usual1y give the exact solution of the problem.
In 1970 Vese1y /1/ gave the foundations of the ana1ytical method for
fault tree analysis. Vese1y's theory was improved by the present author.
A computer program for fault tree analysis was developed based on this
theory / 2; 3 /. This computer program proved to be the best ana1ytica1
program for fault tree analysis in the Federa1 Repub1ic of Germany / 4 /.
Vese1y's method can be app1ied on1y to coherent systems with binary
(two states) components. Another important limitation of the method is
that the boo1ean function which describes the TOP variable of the fault
tree must not contain negated variables. Finally the· theory does not give
any indication on how to handle statistical1y dependent components.
Since there are components (e. g. a switch) which have more than two
s tates J a theory was deve10ped by the author in 1977 /5/ to handle sys-
tems with mu1tistate cornponents. Here the basic idea was introduced to
associate the primary variables with the states of the primary components
instead of with the primary components. In addition the basic boo1ean a1-
gorithms were described. In 1978 the author /6/ showed that the technique
of mu1tistate super-components can be used to remove statistica1 depen-
dencies from a fault tree, by introducing supercomponents defined lOad hoc"
with more than two states.
An interesting feature of the method proposed in /5/ and /6/ is that
the boolean function which describes the TOP variable of the fault tree
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does not necessarily need to be coherent. In addition boolean functions con-
taining negated variables can be treated.
A formalization of the theory by means of the so called "boolean algebra
with restricted' variables" has been developed by the authot in /7/, and /8/.
It is shown in /8/ that the boolean algebra with restricted variables
(b.a.w.r.v.) is the common language which can be used in both fault tree ana-
lysis and state analysis, thus allowing the combination of the two techniques
in a more manageable way. This feature is of particular value for handling
statistical dependencies in fault trees. The importance of the b.a.w.r.v.
was recognised in /9/. where it was said that the b.a.w.r.v. "will play the
role that Vesely' s paper played ten years ago" /9/.
In /10/ the coherent systems were defined for the more general case in
which multistate (two or more than two states) primary components are con-
tained in a system. Here the concept of "associated coherent function" of a
given boolean function is introduced.
Based on the theory given in /7/; /8/ and /10/ the computer program MUSTA-
FA was developed to analyze fault trees of coherent and non coherent systems
containing statistically independent as weIl as dependent components with
two or more than two states.
In this paper another important application of the b.a.w.r.v. will be exa-
mined,. namely fault tree modularization.
In the case of very large systems with many interconnections the total
nunher of minimal cut sets (m.c.s.) of a fault tree may become extremely large
(e.g. more than 107). In this case the usual m.C.s. approach is not only com-
putationally impossible but also meaningless because it does not offer any
synthetic overview of system behaviour. This deficiency was also pointed out
in the german reactor risk study /11/.
For this reason attempts have been made /12; 13/ to modularize large fault
trees. In order to briefly illustrate the previously available methods, let
us consider the fault tree 1 of Fig. 1. The meaning of the symbols used in
Fig. 1 are explained in Table I. The primary components underneath gate GOg
are different from the primary components located underneath the rest of the
fault tree. The same holds for gate GIO. One can therefore calculate the fault
tree 1 by treating the gates G09 and GIO as primary variables.
3Fault tree 1 can be dissected into three smaller fault trees, namely G09,
GIO and the main fault tree in which G09 and GIO enter as primary variables
(modules). The three resulting fault trees can be analyzed separately one
after the oher, and the results are properly comhined to calculate fault
tree I.
It is important to point out that the theory available from the literature
allows the modularization based on single gates only.
With reference to fault tree 1 it is not possible to handle the gate GOS
as a module because some of the primary COmponents underneath GOS (F and H)
are also underneath G06. The same holds for G06. Consider now the gate GOS
and G06 together (as a set). The primary components underneath the set of
gates GOS and G06 (E; F; Hand K) are different fr Dm the primary components
located underneath the rest of the fault tree. One could therefore try to mo-
dularize fault tree I by considering the gates GOS and G06 not individually
but together as a set.
The theory presented in this paper allows the extension of the concept
of modularization from that based on a single gate to that based on a set
of gates.
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Ta ble 1
List of Symbols used in the Fault Trees.
Sym bol
o
Meani ng
Primary Variable
Non Primary Variable
oR Gate
AN 0 Gate
NOT Gate
MAJORITV Gate
(at least k out of n)
Note: A marked point at the input of a gate
means that the variable is negated.
(see NOT Gate).
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TOP
Fig. 1: Fault Tree 1
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1. Generalities on the boolean algebra with restricted variables
According to what is said in the introduction, the basic idea of the boo-
lean algebra with restricted variables is that.of associating the primary va-
riables (literals) with the states of the primary components instead of with
the primary components.
A primary component will be indicated by a lower case letter. For instance
8 J b, c are components.
Astate of a primary component will be indicated by the same notation as the
primary component to which it belongs followed by a positive integer number
(aO, al, a2, etc.). In general we shall have aq with q= 0; 1; 2 .... ; na - 1
where na is the total number of states belonging to primary component a.
We now associate with each state aq a boolean variable Aq (literal) which
takes the value 1 if primary component I'alloccupies state 8q and the v'aille 0
. f" "d1 a Des not occuPy 8q.
The event
(1-1)
indicates that primary components Ilalloccupies state aq.
Conversely, the event
na-l
aq =U ak
k=O
(1-2)
. d' h' .11 d f10 lcates t at prlmary component a Des not occupy state aq and there are
occupies one of its other possible states (Le. the union of all remaining states).
Note the one to one equivalence between state aq (small a) and boolean
variable Aq (capital A) associated with it. We have
and
aq {Aq I}
aq~ {Aq = I}_ {Aq = O}
(1-3)
(1-4)
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since a primary component~ occupy one of its states and ~ occupy only
one state at a time, the variables Aq must obviously satisfy the following
two types of restrietions.
Restrietion Type 1
. ·na-l
V Aq ~ 1
q~O
Restrietions Type 2
The disjunction of all binary variables associated
with the same primary component is always equal to 1.
(1-5)
The conjunction of two different binary variables asso-
ciated with the same primary component is always equal
to O.
(q " k) q; k =O;1;2;"';na-l (1-6)
Note that there is only one restrietion type 1 and na·(na - 1) / 2 restric-
dons type 2.
The complement rule is also important.
Complement rule A negated (complemented) literal is equal to the dis-
junction of all remaining literals belonging to the
same primary component. that is
na-l
Aq ~ YAk
k~O
(k " q) (1-7)
Note that the complement rule can be derived from the restrietions and
viceversa /7/.
rt has been shown in /7/8/ and /10/ that the boolean algebra with restriced
variables allows one to operate on boolean variables in a way similar to the
traditional boolean algebra, but with the additional rules given by Eqs. 1-5
to 1-7. These additional rules apply only among the primary variables (literals)
which belong to the same primary component. There are no additional rules among
primary variables which do not belong to the same primary component.
The following definitions have already been introduced in /7/. /8/ and /10/
and will be used throughout this paper.
Definitions
1. A monomial is a conjuction of literals.
Note that by definition a monomial does not contain negated literals.
(1-8)
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2. A zero monomial is a monomial which is always equal to zero.
A monomial is identical with zero if it contains at least two different
literals of the same primary component (restrictions type 2),
3. A literal is' said to be obligatory if its deletion in a given monomial
alters the truth table of the monomial.
Repeated literals are not obligatory,
Bi 1\ Bi = Bi
4. An irredundant monomial is a non zero monomial which contains only obli-
gatory literals.
5. A complete monomial (minterm) is an irredundant monomial which has a numr
ber of literals equal to the number of primary components present in the
system.
6. Tf two irredundant monomials are such that the first (say X ) contains
all literals of the second one (say Y ), the first monomial implies the
second one. The first monomial (X ) is called subsuming monomial and the
second one (Y) subsumed monomial.
1. A disjunctive form of a boolean function is any disjunction of monomials
which is equivalent to the function.
R. The disjunctive canonical form of a boolean function is that disjunctive
form of the function in which every monomial is complete.
9. A monomial belonging to a disjunctive form of a boolean function is said
to be obligatory if its deletion in the disjunctive form alters the truth
table of the function.
A monomial is not obligatory if (1) it is a zero monomial, or (2) it sub-
sumes another monomial of the disjunctive form, or (3) it implies
the disjunction of two or more other monomials of the disjunctive form.
10. A disjunctive form of a boolean function is called a normal disjunctive
form if (1) all monomials are irredundant and (2) no subsuming monomial
is contained in it.
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11. An irredundant disjunctive form of a boolean function is anormal dis-
junctive form of the function which ceases to be a disjunctive form of
the function if one of its monomials isremoved (deleted).
The monomials of an irredundant disjunctive form are allobligatory.
12. An irredundant monomial (say X) is said to be a prime monomial (or rrime
implicant) of a boolean function (say TOP) if (1) X implies the TOP and
(2) every subsumed monomial Y obtained from X by replacing one of its
literals with 1 does not imply the TOP.
Prime monomials are also currently called minimal cut sets in the literature.
13. A base of a boolean function is any disjunction of prime monomials which
is equivalent to the function.
14. The complete base oE a boolean function is the disjunction of all its
prime monomials.
15. An irredundant base of a boolean function is a base which ceases to be a
base if one of its prime monomials is removed (deleted).
The prime monomials of an irredundant base are all obligatory.
16. The three simplification rules, which allow one to get anormal disjunc-
tive form from a disjunctive 'form are thefollowing:
1. Delete the repeated literals of a monomial (idempower law).
2. Delete zero monomials (exclusion law).
3. Delete subsuming monomials (a~sorption law).
17. We call intact literal (or intact primary variable) of a primary compo-
nent that literal which is associated with the intact state oE the prima-
ry component.
For convection the literal with the index "0" is the intact literal.
For instance AO, Ba, CO are the intact literals respectively of the
primary components A, B, C.
18. A boolean function is said to be irredundant if it has only one base which
is at the same time complete and irredundant.
19. A boolean function is said to be coherent if at least one literal (the
intact literal) of each primary component does not appear in the comple-
te base of the function.
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It is important to point out /10/ that a coherent function is irredundant
but that an irredundant function is not necessari1y coherent.
20. The associated coherent function of a given boo1ean function TOP is that
function ~ which is generated from any normal disjunctive form of the
TOP by rep1acing all intact literals by 1.
Due to the way in which the function p is generated, one can easi1y
verify that TOP implies 1.
If a boo1ean function is coherent, its associated coherent function is
identica1 with the boo1ean function. The reverse is also true.
The fo110wing ru1es on coherent boo1ean functions are important /10/.
Ru1e 1
If anormal disjunctive form of a boo1ean function is such
that at least one 1itera1 of each primary cornponent does
not appear in it, the function is coherent, and .the normal
disjunctive form is the on1y base of the function.
Ru1e 2
If a boo1ean function is coherent, its base can be ca1cu-
1ated from any of its normal disjunctive forms by rep1acing
all intact literals by 1 and by app1ying the absorption 1aw
among the monomials.
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2. ~eseription of the method
","eeording to /8/ the oeeurrenee probability "P" of the event that a sto-
~hastie boo1ean variable takes the va1ue 1 is equa1 to the expeeted va1ue "E"
of the stoehastie boolean variable, that is
P { TOP = 1 } =
For more details about the above equation see ehapter 2 of /8/.
In the fo1lowing we shall speak of the expeeted va1ue of a stoehastie boolean
variable and we sha1l mean by that the oeeurrenee pro),ability of the assoei-
ated event.
In the n11Swing we sha11 use the symbols + and • to indieate the operations
respeetive1y of disjunetions (V) and eonjunetions ( A) among boo1ean variab-
1es.
Note that the symbols + and • indieate the arithmetiea1 operations respeeti-
vely of addition and mu1tip1ieation when they are used in eonjunetion with ex-
peeted values of boolean variables.
The method will be deseribed step by step by applying it to a fault tree.
Let us eonsider the a1ready mention..d faul t tree I (Fig. I). The primary
components of the fault tree are A; B, C, D, E, F; H, K, L, M, N and P.
The primary eomponents are all binary, i.e. they have two variables, one asso-
eiated with the fai1ed state (failed variable) and one assoeiated with the
intaet state (intaet variable). So in the ease of the primary eomponent A we
have the primary variable Al whieh is assoeiated with the fai1ed state and the
primary variable AO whieh is assoeiated with the intaet state. The two primary
variables AO and Al are restrieted variables. We have:
AO Al = 0
AO + Al = 1
Aö = Al
Ai AO
The fault tree of Fig. 1 eontains only failed variables, namely Al; B1, Cl,
D1, E1, F1, R1, K1, L1, Ml, N1 and P1. Sinee the fault tree does not eontain
any intaet variable, the boo1ean funetion TOP is eoherent.
The fault tree 1 is very simple and eould be solved without any diffieulty by
app1ying the usua1 ana1ytiea1 methods.
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However, due to its simplicity, fault tree I is suitable for introducing
the method, because all operations can be carried out by hand.
We introduce first some terminology of fault tree analysis. It is a cornmon
practice in fault tree analysis to classify the variables (vertices) into
two categories:' primary variables and non primary variables. The non primary
variables will be called gates here.
Definition 21
The input variables of a gate are called predecessors of
the gate.
Definition 22
A successor of a variable is any gate to which the variable
is an input.
Definition 23
A route in an ordered sequence of variables which (I) starts
with a primary variable, (2) ends with the TOP variable and
(3) in which each variable is a successor of the precedingvariable
and a predecessor of the following variable.
With reference to fault tree I of Fig. I, observe for instance that each
one of the two sequences
FI - G09 - G05 - GOI - TOP
MI - GIO G08 - G04 TOP
is a route of the fault tree ..
Definition 24
A bundle is a set of routes.
For example the two routes listed above constitute a bundle.
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Definition 25
The territory of a given bund1e is the set of all primary eomponents
assoeiated with the primsry variables eontained in the routes of the
bund1e.
Referring to the bund1e eomposed of the two routes shown above, notiee that
the primary variables be10nging to the routes of the bund1e are FI and MI.
The primary eomponents assoeiated with these primary variables are therefore
Fand M. The set {F;M} eonsti tutes the territory of the bund1e.
Se1eet now an arbitrary set (group) 'of gates of fault tree I, for examp1e
G05 and G06. Consider the eomp1ete set of routes whieh eontain either G05
or G06 or both.
They are:
EI - G05 - GOI - TOP
FI - G09 - G05 - GOI - TOP
HI - G09 - G05 - GOI - TOP
FI - G09 - G06 - G02 - TOP
HI - G09 - G06 - G02 - TOP
KI - G06 - G02 - TOP
Eaeh of the above six routes is said to be interna1 with respeet to the
group of gates G05 and G06. The bund1e made of these six routes is ea11ed
the interna1 bund1e and its territory the interna1 territory of the group
of gates G05 and G06. By inspeetion, the interna1 territory is, in this
ease, the set {E;F;H;K}.
Consider now all the remaining routes of fault tree I. They are:
AI - GOI - TOP
BI - G02 - TOP
LI - G07 - G03 - TOP
CI - G03 - TOP
MI - GIO - G07 - G03 - TOP
NI - GIO - G07 - G03 - TOP
MI - GIO - G08 - G04 - TOP
NI - GIO - G08 - G04 - TOP
PI - G08 - G04 - TOP
DI - G04 - TOP
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Notice that non of the above ten routes contains G05 and/or G06.
These routes are said to be external with respect to the group of
gates G05 and G06. The bundle made of the above ten routes is called the
external bundle and its territory the external territory of the group of
gates G05 and G06. By inspection, the external territory is, in this example,
the set {AjBjLjCjMjNjPjD}.
In summary, given an arbitrary group of gates, each route of the fault tree
is either interna1 or external with respect to the selected gates. The inter-
nal routes are those which contain at least one gate of the group, while the
external routes do not contain any gate of the group. The set of all internal
routes constitutes the internal bundle and similarly the set of all external
routes constitutes the external bundle. The set of all primary components
associated with the primary variables contained in the internal bundle consti-
tutes the internal territory of the selected group of gates. Likewise, the set
of all primary components associated with the primary variables contained in the
external bundle constitutes the external territory.
The above definitions allow one to identify, for any arbitrary group of gates,
the associated internal and external territories.
In the example the following table can be finally set up:
Selected Group of Gates G05j G06
Associated Internal Territory E' F' Hj K, ,
Associated External Territory A' B' C' D' Lj Mj Nj P, , , ,
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Notiee that the two territories have no primary eomponent in eommon. In
this ease we say that the two territories are disjoint.
Definition 26
Two terr1tories are said to be disjoint if they have no primary
eomponent in eommon.
sinee the internaI and external territories of the seleeted group of gates
(GOS and G06) are disjoint, we shall soon see that the group of gates ean
be analyzed separately. For this reason we say that the group of gates is
logieally independent.
Definition 27
A group of gates is said to be logieally independent if its internal
and external territories are disjoint.
Consider the internal bundle of Gas and Ga6. Notiee that no route of the
internal bundle eontains both Gas and Ga6. We say that the group of gates
Gas and Ga6 is linear.
Definition 28
A group of gates is said to be linear if eaeh route of its internal
bundle eontains one and only one gate of the group.
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If a group of gates is linear and logically independent, it is possible to build
with them a supercomponent, whose variables can be treated as primary variab-
les of the fault tree. Each variable of the supercornponent can be considered
in turn as the TOP variable of a fault tree which can be analyzed separately
from the main fault tree as weIl as from the fault trees of the other.variab-
les of the supercomponent. We shall illustrate this break down procedure by
applying it to the group of gates GOS and G06.
We consider the complements of GOS and G06, namely GOS and G06. The following
conjunctions can be constructed with the four variables GOS; G06; G55 and G06.
Ql = GOS G06 (2-1)
Q2 = GOS G06 (2-2)
Q3 = GOS G06 (2-3)
QO = GOS G06 (2-4)
The four variables QO; Ql; Q2 and Q3 can be regarded as the variables of a
component (supercornponent Q) because they satisfy the appropriate restrictions.
In fact starting from the equations 2-1 to 2-4 it is easy to verify that
QO + Ql + Q2 + Q3 = 1
Ql Q2 = 0
Ql Q3 = 0
Ql Q() = 0
Q2 Q3 = 0
Q2 QO = 0
Q3 QO = 0
Restriction 1st Type
Restrictions 2nd Type
The equations 2-1 to 2-3 can be solved with respect to the variables GOS and
G06 which are present in the fault tree.
We get
GOS = Ql + Q2 (2-5)
and G06 Q2 + Q3 (2-6)=
- 17 -
The Eqs. 2-1 to 2-3 and 2-5 to 2-6 can be used to "cut" the original fault
tree into four fault trees. This is diagramatica11y shown in Fig. 2:The
equations 2-5 and 2-6 are used in the main fault tree (the upper part) in
which the variables Q1, Q2
component Q. The equations
Q2 and Q3 each one being a
and Q3 enter as the primary variables of super-
2-1 to 2-3 are used to define the variables Q1,
TOP variable of a separate fault tree. (see Fig. 2)
Notice that the group of gates G07 and G08 (Fig. I) is also linear and logica11y
independent. We introduce here the supercomponent R with four states in a
simi1ar way as we have done in the case of Q. We fina11y obtain that the ori-
ginal fault tree has been cut into seven simpler fault trees (Fig. 3). The
six new variables Q1 to Q3 and R1 to R3 enter as primary variables in the
main fault tree (the upper fault tree). Each one of the six new variables
is in turn a TOP variable of a separate fault tree. All seven fault trees are
shown in Fig. 3.
The minimal cut sets of the main fault tree can be easi1y ca1cu1ated by uS1ng
the ru1es of boo1ean algebra with restricted variables. The a1gorithms are
given in 171; 181 and 110/. The minimal cut sets are shown in Fig. 4 under
the heading TOP.
We can group the minimal cut sets of the TOP with respect to all possib1e con-
junctions among the primary variables of the supercomponents Q and R. By
doing that, we get
TOP = Xo( + Q1 • xp + Q3 • Xi + Q2 + R1 • X5 + R3 • X f. +
+R2 + Q1 • R1 + Q1 • R3 + Q3 • R1 + Q3 • R3
where
Xl>( = Al. B1 + Al • Cl + Al • 01 + B1 • Cl + B1 • 01 +
+C1 • 01
(2-7)
(2-8)
Xp = B1 + Cl + 01 (2-9)
Xt = Al + Cl + 01 (2-10 )
xJ = Al + B1 + 01 (2-11 )
xt, = Al + B1 + Cl (2-12 )
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TOP
01
El
02 0.3
Fig.2: Fault Tree 1. Modularisation with one
Supercomponent ( a)
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TOP
01 02 03 Rl R2 R3
Fig. 3: Fault Tree 1. Modularisation with two
Supercomponents (o. and R)
- 20 -
TOP
XY =
Xß =
El Kl
111 NI
PlLl
Fl Hl
Ll PO HO
Ll PO NO
El KO FO
El KO HO
Pl LO MO
Pl LO NO
Kl EO FO
Kl EO HO
R2 =
R3 =
R1 ..
Q3 =
Q2 =
Ql =
Al
Al
Bl
Cl
BI
Cl
Dl
Al
Cl
Bl
Dl
01
Al Bl
Al Cl
Al 01
Bl Cl
Bl 01
Cl 01
=
..
=
Xa.
XÖ
XE
Al Bl
Al Q3
Bl Ql
Q2
Al Cl
Al Rl
Cl Ql
Ql Rl
Al 01
Al R3
01 Ql
Ql R3
Bl Cl
BI Rl
Cl Q3
Q3 Rl
BI 01
BI R3
01 Q3
Q3 R3
Cl 01
Cl R3
01 Rl
R2
Fig. 4: Fault Tree 1. Minimal Cut Sets (M.C.S.) of the main fault tree
and of the modules.
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The block diagram of Fig. S shows the interconnections among the various boo-
lean functions, that is Eq. 2-7. Each block (module) is a boolean function.
Two blocks belonging to two different columns are pairwise each other logi-
cally independent, that is they have no primary component in common. The
blocks belongirig to the same row are pairwise each other logically independent.
We ca1culate now the minimal cut sets of the variables of the supercomponents
Q and R, e.g. the fault trees Ql, Q2, Q3, R1, R2 and R3 in Fig. 3.
We calculate Q1. From Fig. 3 we get
Q1 GOS G06
G05 = E1 + G09
G06 = K1 + G09
G09 = F1 • H1
Taking into account Eqs. 2-14 to 2-16, Eq. 2-13 becomes
(2-D )
(2-l4 )
(2-l5)
(2-l6)
Q1 = (EI + Fl • Hl)
=(E1+ Fl • Hl) KO
(Fl + Hl) =
(FO + HO) =
= E1 • KO • FO + E1 KO . HO (2-17 )
The minimal cut sets of the variables of all modules are also given in Fig. 4.
Let us now assurne that all primary components of fault tree 1 are statistica1-
ly independent. The expected values oe the primary variab1es{that is the occur-
rence probabilities of the primary events) are assumed to be known and are
given in Table 2.
With reference to the block diagram of Fig. 5, we can fina11y calcu1ate the
occurrence probability of the TOP event, that is the expected va1ue of the
TOP variable.
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X"
Ql Xß
Q2
Q3 X)'
.,
Rl Xc
Ql Rl
R3 XE
Ql R3
Q3 Rl
Q3 R3
R2
Fig. 5. Fault Tree 1. Block Diagram
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Table 2
Fault Tree 1. Occurrence Probabilities of the Primary Variables
Primary Expected
Variable Value
Al 10 -2
Bl 10 -2
Cl 10 -2
Dl 10 -2
El -210
Fl 10 -1
Hl 10 -1
Kl 10 -2
Ll 10 -2
Ml 10 -1
Nl 10 -1
Pl -210
- 24 -
We have
(2-18)
The expected values of the boolean functions Xo< to X.E ,Ql to Q3 and Rl
to R3 can be calculated from the expected values of the primary variables.
With reference to Fig. 4 and taking into account the numerical values of
table 2, we get:
E { xo<} ';; E { Al } • E {BI} + E { Al} oE {Cl} + E { Al }. E {Dl } +
E { BIJ oE { Cl} + E { BI}' E { Dl} + E { Cl}. E {Dl} =
= 6 • 10-4
(2-19)
E{Xß} '" {BIJ {Cl} + E {Dl } 3 . 10-2 (2-20)= E + E =
E { X'6 } '" { Al} + {Cl} + E {Dl } • 10-2 (2-21)= E E = 3
{ XV}
~ { AIj + E {BI} { Dl } . 10-2 (2-22)E = E + E = 3
E [ Xt} ~E {Al} + E {BI} {cd -2 (2-23)+ E = 3 . 10
{ Ql} '" {El] 10-2E = E = (2-24)
E {Q2} ~ {Fl} {HlJ= E • E +
E {El}.E {KlJ = 1.01 . 10-2 (2-25 )
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{. Q33 N E {Kl } 10-2 (2-26)E = =
{ R1} w {LI} 10-2 (2-27)E = E =
{ Rz} "" [Mi} {Nt] tLlJ.E {Pl}=E = E . E + E
-2
= 1. 01 • 10
(2-28)
E { R31 N E{PI} -2 (2-29)= = 10
.:,
The expected values of the modules are written inside the corresponding block
of the block diagrsm ofFig. 5. This has been done in Fig. 6 wrere the operations
of Eq. 2-18 have been carried out. The expected value of the TOP is equal to
-22.24 • 10 .
In order to compare the'results of this rnethod with those of other methods,
one rnay be interested in'cslculating the minimal cut sets of the whole fault
tree, starting fromthe minimal cut sets of each module.
We notice that the minimal cut sets of the variables Ql, Q3, R 1 and R3 con-
tain intact primary variables. On the other hand we know that the TOP is a co-
herent boolean function. Dueto the theorems developed in/10/ and mentioned in
section 2 of this paper,the coherent function TOP rernains unaltered if in one
\'f itß 'normal disjuncdve forrnS a11 intact variables are replaced by '1.
According to definition 20 of section 2, the associated coherent'function
of a given boolean function (say QI) is that function (say CQI) obtained
from Ql by replacing the intact variables by 1.
With reference to Fig. 4, we can calculate the associated coherent functions
of Ql, Q3, Rl and R3. We have
CQl
CQ3
CRI
CR3
=
=
EI
Kl
LI
PI
(2-30)
(2-31)
(2-32)
(2-33)
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6'10-4
10- 2 3.10- 2
1.01.10- 2
10-2 3, 10- 2
10- 2 3.10- 2
10-2 10-2
10 -2 3'10- 2
10-2 10-2
10- 2 10 -2
10- 2 10- 2
1.01.10- 2
Expected Va1ue of TOP: 2.24'10- 2
Fig. 6 Fault Tree 1. Ca1cu1ation of the Occurrence Probability of the TOP.
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The functions Q2, R2 and Xo< to xe are not effected by this operation because
they do not contain any intact primary variable.
By replacing in Eq. 2-7 the boolean functions Ql, Q3, Rl and R3 by their asso-
ciated coherent functions, we get
x cx. + CQl • x~ + CQ3TOP =
+ CR3 XE + R2 + CQl
xt + Q2 + CRI . X S +
CRI + CQl • CR3 +
+ CQ3 • CRI + CQ3 • CR3 (2-34)
It is important to point out that the operation of replacing the intact va-
riables by 1 alters the functions Ql, Q3, Rl and R3 respectively into CQl,
CQ3, CRI and CR3 but leaves the function TOP unaltered.
The number of minimal cut sets of each associated coherent function is written
inside the corresponding block of the block dia gram '(Fig. 7). The number of
minimal cut sets (m.c.s.) of each row is simply given by multiplying the num-
ber of m.cos. of all blocks belonging to the same row. Each result is written
in correspondence of each row on the right side of the block diagram (see
Fig. 7)0 The total number of minimal cut sets is simply given by summing up
the number of m. c 0s. of a11 rows 0 This operation is also "'<Mn in Fig. 7. The
total number of m.cos. of the fault tree 1 is equal to 260
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6
1 3
2
.
1 3
1 3
1 1
1 3
1 1
1 1
1 1
2
6
3
2
3
3
1
3
1
1
1
2
Total Number of M.C.S. 26
Fig. 7 Fault Tree 1. Ca1cu1ation of the Number of Minimal Cut Sets (M.C.S.).
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3. An example
Fig. 8 shows a larger fault tree (fault tree 2) which was proposed to the
authors for test purposes by the Safety and Reliability Directorate (S.R.D.),
UKAEA, Warrington, Great Britain. The TOP event of this fault tree is the
failure of aPart of a reactor protective system which is described in /14/.
The occurrence probabilities of the primary events are given in Table 3.
17 . .. 1This fault tree has about 4.18 . 10 cut sets, 5630 of them be1ng m1n1ma
cut sets.
By looking at the fault tree of Fig. 8, we notice that the group of gates
G06 and G07 is linear and logically independent. We therefore introduce the
. 2
supercomponent seol with 2 = 4 states, namely
SCOl-l = G06 G07 (3-1)
SCOl-2 G06 G07 (3-2 )
Seol-3 = G06 G07 (3-3)
SCOl-O = G06 G07 (3-4)
By applying the same procedure described in the previous section, one can
cut the original fault tree into four smaller fault trees as it is shown in
Fig. 9.
was 48.5 secs. on a IBM 3033 computer. From Fig. 11 it results that
---c::.5(expected value: 1.275 • 10 ) and M002 (expected value
The computer program MUSTAMO executes this cut of a large fault tree into
smaller fault trees and analyzes all the resulting fault trees separately one
after the other.
The block dia gram of fault tree 2 is shown in Fig. 10. Here the block cha-
racterized by the number 30 consists of the failed state of the primary comr
ponent 30. The minimal cut sets of the modules 'MOOl and M002 are listed re-
spectively in Table 4 and 5. Fig. 11 shows the expected values of each module.
These expected values are calculated by simply summing up the expected values
of all mini~l cut sets belonging to the module. It is known that this proce-
dure overestimates the expected value of a module. The occurrence probability
-5
of the TOP is 1.947 • 10 . The CPU time for the complete analysis of fault
tree 2
the modules SCOl-l
-6
6.699 • 10 ) give by rar the largest contributions to the occurrence proba-
bility of the TOP. For this reason the expected values of these two modules
have been calculated by using the more precise method described in /8/. The
results are written in Fig. 11 between brackets. The exact value of the occur-
rence probability of the TOP results to be 1.794 • 10-5•
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Fig. 8: Fault Tree 2
03
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Tab1e 3
Expected Va1ues of the Primary Variables of Fault Tree 2
Primary Variable Expected Va1ue
03 3.5 10 -2From 01 to
·
From 04 06 2.2 10 -2to •
1 10 -1From 07 to 15 •
8.8 10 -4From 22 to 27
·
30 1. 75 10 -3From to 35
·
From 41 -3to 45 8.75 • 10
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Fig.9: Modularization of Fault Tree 2 by means of one
Supercomponent (SeOl)
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seOl-l
30SeOl-3
SeOl-2 MOOl
30 MOOl
M002
Fig. 10 Block Diagram of Fault Tree 2. Modularization with
one Supercomponent (SeOl)
ROW
1
2
3
4
5
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Tab1e 4
Fault Tree 2. Minimal Cut Sets (M.C.S.) of Module MOO1
M.C.S. Composition
1 31 32 33
2 31 32 43
3 31 42 33
4 31 42 43
5 41 32 33
6 41 32 43
7 41 42 33
8 31 32 34
9 31 32 44
10 31 42 34
11 31 42 44
12 41 32 34
13 41 32 44
14 41 42 34
15 31 32 35
16 31 32 45
17 31 42 35
18 31 42 45
19 41 32 35
20 41 32 45
21 41 42 35
22 31 33 34
23 31 33 44
24 31 43 34
M.C.S. Composition
25 31 43 44
26 41 33 34
27 41 33 44
28 41 43 34
29 31 33 35
30 31 33 45
31 31 43 35
32 31 43 45
33 41 33 35
34 41 33 45
35 41 43 35
36 31 34 35
37 31 34 45
38 31 44 35
39 31 44 45
40 41 34 35
41 41 34 45
42 41 44 35
43 32 33 34
44 32 33 44
45 32 43 34
46 32 43 44
47 42 33 34
48 42 33 44
M.C.S. Composition
49 42 43 34
50 32 33 35
51 32 33 45
52 32 43 35
53 32 43 45
54 42 33 35
55 42 33 45
56 42 43 35
57 32 34 35
58 32 34 45
59 32 44 35
60 32 44 45
61 42 34 35
62 42 34 45
63 42 44 35
64 33 34 35
65 33 34 45
66 33 44 35
67 33 44 45
68 43 34 35
69 43 34 45
70 43 44 35
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Tab1e 5
Fault Tree 2. Composition of the Minimal Cut Sets (M.C.S.)
of Module M002.
M.C.S. Composition
1 41 42
·
43
2 41 42
·
44
3 41
·
42 45
4 41
·
43
·
44
5 41
·
43
·
45
6 41 44
·
45
7 42
·
43 44
8 42
·
43 45
9 42 44
·
45
10 42
·
44 45
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1.275'10- 5
-5(1.13'10 )
8.67.10- 6 1,75,10- 3
8.67'10- 6 4.88,10-6
1.75'10- 3 4,88'10 -6
6.699'10- 6
Expected Va1ue of TOP:
-5
L 947 ·10
(1.794'10- 5 )
Fig. 11 Fault Tree 2. Modu1arization with one Supercomponent (SC01)
Ca1cu1ation of the Occurrence Probability of the TOP.
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group being characterized by the length of the m.c.s. that
primary variables contained in the m.c.s.
in this paper with thoseIn order to
of S.R.D., the
better compare the results obtained
minimal cut sets (m.c.s.) have been divided into groups, each
is the number of
Table 6 gives the total number of m.c.s. contained in the associated coherent
functions of each block ordered according to their length. Note that only the
associated coherent functions CSCOJ-2 and CSCOI-3 are different from the
functions (SCOI-2 and SCOI-3) from which they have respectively derived.
The information contained in Table 6 has been used to calculate the
total number of m.c.s. contained in each row of the block diagram ordered
according to their length. This result is shown in Table 7, where the
total number of m.c.s. ordered according to their length of the whole fault tree
has been calculated (see last column of Table 7). The results up to the length 6
of the m.c.S. are identical with those of S.R.D. /15/. The remaining m.c.S. of
order 7 could not be compared because the computer programs available at S.R.D.
were not able to calculate all m.c.s. of the fault tree. From Table 7 one gets
that the total number of m.c.s. of the fault tree 2 is equal to 5630.
The group of gates 10X, 10Y and 10Z of fault tree 2 (Fig. 8) is also
linear and logically independent. One could introduce therefore an additional
supercomponent with 23 = 8 states, which is obtained by combining the three
gates and their complements in all possible ways, that is
10 X • 10 Y 10 Z
10 X • 10 Y 10 Z
10 X lOY • lO Z
lOX lOY 10 Z
10 X 1äY • 10 Z
10 X 10 Y • 10 Z
lOX 10 Y • 10 Z
10 X lOY • lOZ
It is possible however to reduce the number of states of the second super-
component from 8 to 5 by condensing the first four states into a single
macros ta te .
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Table 6
Fault Tree 2. Total Number of M.C.S. contained in each Block.
Length Block (associated coherent function)
,
of M.C.S. SCOI-I CSCOl-2 CSCOl~3 30 MOOI MOO2
I 1
2 3 3
3 70 10
4 18 72 72
5 180
6 27
Total 225 75 75 I 70 10
Table 7
Fault Tree 2. Total Number of M.C.S. contained in each Row.
Length Row
of M.C.S. TotalI 2 3 4 5
1
2
3 3 10 13
4 18 70 88
5 180 72 210 462
6 27 27
7 5040 5040
Total 225 75 5250 70 10 5630
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If one calculates with the code MUSTAMO the fault tree of Fig. 8 (or those
of Fig. 9) by considering the gates 10X, 10Y and 10Z as failted states of
three different primary components, one gets a solution of the type
TOP = 10X • KX + 10Y • KY + 10Z. KZ +
+(10X 10Y + lOX • lOZ + lOY • lOZ) (3-5)
where KX, KY and KZ are boolean functions which do not contain 10X, 10Y and
lOZ.
Let us indicate with Al the boolean function between brackets ~n Eq. 3-5,
that is
Al 10X • 10Y + 10X • 10Z + 10Y • 10Z (3-6)
Eq. 3-5 can be written as follows:
TOP = (lOX + Al) . KX + (10Y + Al) • KY +
+(lOZ + Al) • KZ + Al
(3-7)
Eq. 3-7 means that the TOP remains unaltered if one replaces in the fault tree
of Fig. 8 (or in those of Fig. 9) the variables 10X, 10Y and 10Z respectively
with (lOX + Al), (lOY + Al) and (lOZ + Al). This allows us to introduce the
supercomponent SC02 with five states, namely
Se02-4 = Al 10X lOY + 10X 10Z + 10Y . 10Z
SC02-l = (lOX + Al) Al 10X IÖY IOz
Se02-2 (lOY + Al) Al 10X lOY WZ
Se02-3 = (lOZ + Al) TI = 10X 10Y • lOZ
- 10Y IOz'se02-0 lOX . •
(3-8)
(3-9)
(3-10)
(3-11)
Note that the macrovariable (macrostate) SC02-4 results from the dis-
junction (condensation) of the four variables (states) 10X . IOY . 10Z,
-- --10X . 10Y . 10Z, IOX . IOY . IOZ, and IOX . 10Y . IOZ.
Fig. 12 shows fault tree 2 cut at two levels, namely G06 and G07 (supercompo-
nent SeOl with four states) and 10X, 10Y and 10Z (supercomponent Se02 with
five states).
- 40 -
Fig. 12: Modulorizotion 01 Foult Tree 2 with two 5upereomponents
(5C01 ond 5C02) in Coseode.
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The computer program MUSTAMO executes the two cuts in cascade of fault
tree 2 and analyses the resulting fault trees (Fig. 12) separately one after
the other starting from the fault trees at the bot tom.
Fig. 13 shows the block dia gram of fault tree 2 with the two cuts in
cascade. The m. c. s. of the· modules NOO 1 to N012 are given in Table 8. The
m.c.s. of the functions MOOl and M002 are given in Tables 4 and 5 respectively.
The expected values of each module are shown in Fig. 14, where the occur-
rence probability of the TOP has
tical with that already obtained
14 one concludes that the modules
the module M002 (expected value
been calculated. Tbe result is of course iden-
in the case of one supercomponent. From Fig.
-5SC02-4 (expected value: 1.274 • 10 ) and
-66.669 • 10 ) give by far the largest con-
tributions to the occurrence probability of the TOP.
Fig. 15 shows the calculation of the total number of minimal cut sets
(m.c.s.). Note that the blocks SC02-0 have disappeared in the block diagram
of Fig. 15 because the associated coherent function of SC02-0 is just 1 and
does not give therefore any contribution to the m.c.s. of the fault tree.
The notations CSCOI-2 and CSCOI-3 in Fig. 15 indicate the associated coherent
functions respectively of SCOI-2 and SCOI-3.
We compare now the block diagram of Fig. 13 with that of Fig. 10. In the
block diagram of Fig. 13 the modules SCOl-l to SCOl-3 have been decomposed
into smaller modules. Tbe block diagram of Fig. 13 can be obtained from that
of Fig. 10 just by carrying out this decomposition.
The block diagram of Fig. 13 is more complex but it Eives also more in-
sight into the importance of the various blocks.. For instance we have already
noticed that the module SCOI-I (225 minimal cut sets, Table 6) gives the
largest contribution to the system unavailability (Fig. 1I). This contri-
bution is almost equal to that of the module SC02-4 (Fig. 14), which is a
part of SCOI-I, has only 72 m.c.s. (Fig. 15) and is therefore easier to
analyze.
The CPU time forthe complete analysis of fault tree 2 with two super-
components in cascade (Fig. 12) was about 3 secs. This value is remarkably
lower than the already mentioned value of 48.5 secs. of the CPU time of the
case with only one supercomponent (Fig. 9).
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N002
NOOJ
rr--~----I
1SC02-l NOOl II SC01-l
1----11/
I
I
I SC02-2
I
I
,.... SC02-J
I
I SC02-4 I
I II N004 IL ----.J
r-:----------------, SC01-J
I SC02-l No09 I;I
I SC02-2 NO 10 I
No06
I SC02-J NO 11 I
I I
I4SC02-0 N012 I
~--------~rr----------,
liSC02-l N005 I;COl-2
I II SC02-2
JO
- :===::=:::::::::
I SC02-J N007 1-----41
I I
I4SC02-0 N008 t-------II
~---' ...__..._-~
MOOl
JO MOOl
M002
Fig. lJ Block Diagram of Fault Tree 2. Modularization with two
Supercomponents (SeOl and SC02) in Cascade.
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Table 8
Fault Tree 2. Two Supercomp. in Cascade - M.C.S. of NOOI to N012
Composition of M.C.S.
Block
Module Ass.Coh.Function
24
·
25 24 25
24
·
27 24 27
lNool
26 2526
·
25
26
·
27 26 27
22
·
23 22 23
22
·
27 22 27
NOO2
26 23 26 23
26
·
27 26 27
22 23 22 23
22
·
25 22 25NOO3
24
·
23 24 23
24
·
25 24 25
22
·
24
·
23
·
25 22 24 23 25
22
·
24
·
23
·
27 22 24 23 27
22
·
24
·
25 · 27 22 24 25 27
22
·
26
·
23
·
25 22 26 23 25
NOO4 22
·
26
·
23
·
27 22 26 23 27
22
·
26
·
25
·
27 22 26 25 27
24
·
26
·
23
·
25 24 26 23 25
24
·
26
·
23
·
27 24 26 23 27
24
·
26
·
25
·
27 24 26 25 27
- - 2424
·
27 • 25NOO5
- 2626
·
27 • 25
22
·
27' TI 22NOO6
- -
26 • 27 • 23 26
Compopition of M.C.S.
~lock
Ass.Coh.FunctionModule
- -22
·
25
·
23 22
NOO7
- -24
·
25 · 23 24
22
·
24 25
·
23 22
·
24
- -
22
·
24
·
27
·
23
- -
22 24
·
27
·
25
- -
22
·
26
·
25
·
23 22
·
26
- -
NOO8 22 · 26 · 27 · 23
- -22
·
26
·
27
·
25
- - 2624
·
26
·
25
·
23 24 ·
- -24
·
26
·
27
·
23
- -24
·
26
·
27
·
25
25
·
24
·
26 25
NOO9
- -27
·
24
·
26 27
23
·
22
·
26 23
NOJO
-
-
27
·
22
·
26 27
23
·
22
·
24 23
NOJ 1
- -25
·
22
·
24 25
23
·
25
·
22
·
24 23 25
- -
23
·
25
·
22
·
26
- -23
·
25
·
26
·
24
- -
23
·
27
·
22
·
24 23
·
27
- -
NOJ2 23 · 27 · 22 · 26
- -
23
·
27
·
24
·
26
- - 2725
·
27 22 24 25
·
- -
25
·
27
·
22
·
26
- -
25
·
27
·
26
·
24
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1,75·1O-31-----~
2,12'10- 6 I
I I -6 II, "-0.996 2.32'10- 6 2.31'10 I
~ --l
I 1.2.10- 3 1. 76'10- 3 2.12'10- 6 I
I -6 II ~ "-0.996 2.32'10- 6 2.31'10 I
~ ..J
rr=-;;;;;.-;;;;;;..;;;..--- - ---,
Irl1.2'10- 3 1.76.10- 3 2.12'10-
6
I)COl-2
I 1.2'10- 3 1.76'10- 3 2 12'10-6 I
rr-- --~ ----3. 72'lO-n
1~1,2'10-3 3.1'10- 6 II SC01-1
: 1.2'10- 3 3.1'10- 6 3.72'10-
9 1/
I 1
......
1.2'10-3 -6 3.72'10-
9
3.1: 10 r=:..:..:..::.....;:c::....+-----------------,
I I
I 1,274'10-5 1 274'10- 5 I
"
0.129'10-)) -12 ,
.....-----15 .4' 10-12 5.4'10 IL .__ -..1
.-------- -- ---- -----
I 2 12'10-
6 I SCOl-3
1.2'10- 3 1.76.10-3 ' 1;1'
11.2'10-3 1.76.10-3 2,12'10-
6 I
'------------------------16,669.10-1 -66.669'10
Expected Va1ue of TOP: 1. 947.10- 5
(1.794'10- 5 )
Fig~ Fault Tree 2. Modularization with two Supercomponents in Cascade.
Ca1cu1ation of the Occurrence Probabi1ity of TOP.
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75
225
1
75
412
If--~----I
I ~ 12 4 I11 I SC01-1
I 12 4 1/
I I
I
r-
I
I 72 :
I I
I 9 IL ----.J1-
12
-- - -2---------1 ;SCOl-3
I 12 2 1
525070
75
212 1-----11
I
I 3 IL ~
rr-----------,
I ~ 12 2 I;SCOl-2
I 12 2 1
I- :===::===:
I 12 2 J-------11
I I
I 3 1------11
L ...--=--.... .J
1 70 70
10 10
Total Number of H.C.S. 5630
Fig. 15 Fault Tree 2. Modularization with two Supercomponents in Cascade.
Ca1cu1ation of the Total Number of Hinima1 Cut Sets (M.C.S.)
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4. A second example
Fig. 16 shows a fault tree of apart of a reactor protective system. We
call this fault tree: fault tree 3. All components of fault tree 3 are
binary with the exception of PI, P2 and P3 which have each three states.
Only the failed states PI,-I to P3-1 and PI-2 to P3-2 are present in the
faul t tree.
Table 9 gives the expected values of the primary variables. These expec-
ted values have been changed by orders of magnitudes from the original true
30 7
values. Fault tree 3 has more than 10 cut sets, about 1.1 • 10 of them
being minimal cut sets (m.c.s.).
The two linear groups of gates el, e2, EI, E2 and GI, G2, KI, K2 are both logi-
cally independent. We can define therefore two supercomponents, namely seOl
d 2 h h · 4 16an seo eac aV1ng 2 = states.
Since the fault tree is symmetrical with respect to the two supercomponents,
we need to analyse only the first (SeOl), the analysis of the second (Se02)
being equivalent.
Table 10 shows the compositions of each state of supercomponent seol. We
note that the 7 variables se02-9 to se02-l5 are equal to zero. This is found
also automatically by MUSTAMO. For this reason the number of states of seOl
re duces to 9.
four non zero variables of the supercomponents
the solution. They are
SeOl - 1
seol. - 2
seOl - 4
seOl - 5
se02 - l.
se02 - 2
se02 - 4
se02 - 5
MUSTAMO breaks down the faul t tree 3 into 17 fault trees. The main faul. t
tree is shown in Fig. 17. MUSTAMO calculates the fault tree of Fig. 17. The
solution is shown in the block diagram of Fig. 18. It is important that only
seol. and Se02 are present in
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The fault trees of the above variables are shown in Fig. 19 (SC01) and
in Fig. 20 (SC02). The fault tree of module M046 is shown in Fig. 21. Fig.
22 shows the common structure of the fault trees of the modules M047 to
M061 The composition of the variables U; V and Z for each module are given
1n the tab1e in the same Fig. 22.
Fig. 23 shows the block dia gram of fault tree
of each module. The occurrence probability of the
3 with the expected
T@P event is 1.12
va1ues
-810 .
Fig. 24 shows the total number of m.c.s. of the associated coherent functions
of each module. The total number of m.c.s. of the fault tree is 1.1220036.107 .
The CPU time for the complete analysis of fault tree 3 was 71 secs.
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Table 9
Fault tree 3. Expected Values of the Primary Variables
Primary Variable Expected Value
Mll M14 8.2569 10
-2
From to
M21 M24 8.2569 10
-2
From to
·
-2
From M31 to M34 8.2569 • 10
-3
From SUI to SU3 2.5933
·
10
From SOl to S03 2.5933 10 -3
5.9996 -5CSO and CSU
·
10
From llV 13V 9.99 10
-4
to
3.9984 10 -4From 21V to 23V
From 41V 43V 1.996 10 -3to
13N -3From llN to 9.901 10
21N 23N 10 -3From to 9.901
- 2
From 31N to 33N 1. 9608 10
From 41N 43N 9.901 10 -3to
From Tl to T3 2.991 10 -3
From CMl to CM4 10-3
From Pl-l to P3-1 9.98 10 -4•
From Pl-2 P3-2 9.98 10 -4to •
From 31V 33V -4to 3.9984 10
CMT 10-3
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Table 10
Fault Tre,e 3. Supercomponent SCO 1
STATE COMPOSITION COMMENT
1 Cl
·
C2 EI E2 Presen t in the resul t
-2 Cl
·
C2
·
EI E2 Present in the result
3 Ci • a
·
EI E2
4 Cl C2 EI
·
E2 Present in the result
- -5 Cl
·
C2 EI E2 Present in the result
- - -6 Cl • C2 EI E2
- -7 Cl C2
·
EI E2
8 Cl C2
·
EI
·
E2
9 Cl C2 EI E2 Z E R 0
10 Cl C2 EI E2 Z E R 0
- -11 Cl C2 EI E2 Z E R 0
-12 Cl C2 EI
·
E2 Z E R 0
Ci - -13 C2 EI E2 Z E R 0
- E214 Cl C2 EI Z E R 0
- - -15 Cl C2 EI E2 Z E R 0
- - -0 Cl C2
·
EI E2
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sall·1
Fig.17: Fault Tree]. Main Fault Tree after Break Down.
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M046
SC01- 5 I-- S(;02-5 r- M049
I- t-r- SC01- 2 SCQ2-5 M050
SCOl-5 f- SC02-2 t- M047t-
u-•
t- SCOl-5 f- SC02-4 t- M053-
I- t-...... SCOl-4 SC02-5 M057
I- t-- SCOl-2 SC02-2 M048
SCOl-2 f- SC02-4 t- M054-
SCOl-5 I- SC02-l t- M05lt-
4....
t- SC01-l I- SC02-5 t- M058
I- I-t- SCOl-4 SC02-2 M055
'-- SCOl-4 f- SC02-4 - M060
...- jsCOl-2 ~ r--SC02-l M052
t- f- r--SC01-l SC02-2 M056
4HI
SC01-l ~ SC02-4 I- M06lt-
'- SCOl-4 f-- SC02-l r-- M059
f-SC01-l SC02-l
Fig. 18 Fault Tree 3. Block Diagram
Fig. 19: Fault Tree 3. Fault Trees of the Variables of Supercomponent seo 1.
'"w
U>
...
Tl T2 T3
Fig.20: Fault Tree 3. Fault Trees ofthe Variables of Supercomponent SCO 2.
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TOP
M046
Fig. 21: Fault Tree 3.
Fault Tree of Module M046
MOOULE
SO 2 SU3 S03 SOl
MOOULE V U Z
MO 52 l-1l 1 HZl ~131
MO 56 M12 ~,12 2 M32
MO 61 '113 '123 '133
MO 59 1-114 /1-124 M34
MO 48 Ml'"M12 '121 -M22 '131-'132
MO 54 '111 -~'113 '121 -1123 H31'M33
MO 51 Ml1 "M14 M21 "MZ4 M31-M34
MO 58 M12.~Il3 '122-~123 l-f32 ·M33
MO 55 M12·M14 M22-M24 M32 -M34
MO 60 M13"H14 1>123 "M24 M33·M34
MO 50 )ll'-M12·M13 M21 -M22 -M23 l-131·H32 "M33
MO 47 !'-111·:r-rlZ·M14 M21 ·MZ2 ·~124 M31·M3Z- t.-134
MO 53 Ml 1 "M13-M14 M21-M23-M24 M31'1133-M34
MO 57 ~1l2·H13·M14 M2Z"M23"M24 M32 ·M33·M34
MO 49 Mll.M1Z.M13.-M14.1121-1122-M23-'12 r131·M3Z-M33·H34
Composilion 01 lhe Varimbles V.U mnd Z
'"a-
Fig.22: Fault Tree 3. Fault Tree of the Modules MO 47 to MO 61
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6.43.10- 9
- 1.08.10- 2 I- 1,03.10- 81. 38 ·10 t-
5,75'10- 13- 1.08'10- 2 9,97' 10- 7r- 5,34'10 ~ r
-
4.36.10-4 9,97'10- 7
6'10- 13
f-- 1. 38' 10 ~ f--
I--
3,8'10-13
- 2.73'10- 4 f-- 9.97.10- 7I-- 1.38'10 r-
5,9'10- 13
L- 5,5'10-5 t- 1.08'10- 2 f-- 9.97'10- 7
13.3'10- 125 34'10-' 4.36'10- 4 I- 1.4'10-4r-
•
t-
-
2.73'10- 4 1.4'10-4
2'10- 12
I-- 5.34·10 t-
-
1,4'10-4
2.01 10-10
-
- t- 1.04. 10- 3 I-1.38'10
;-
L 4.10-4 3.2'10-
12
I-- 2.13·10- t t- 1. 08.10- 2 I--
5.5.10- 5 ~' 36'10-4 1. 4'10-4 3.3.10-
12
I-- I-- I--
-12
5,5'10- 5
2.1 10
'-- ~ 12.73'10- 4 I- 1. 4'10-4
1.14'10-9
5,34'10- 5 1.04.10-3 2.05.10- 2r- I-- I-
2.13'10- 6 4,36. 10-4I- 2,05.10- 2
1.9'10- 11
I-- I-
-
-11
2.13'10- 6 2.73'10-4 7.05'10- 2
1.2' 10
I-- I-- I--
5.5'10- 5 1.04'10-3 I-
.05'10- 2
.17 '10-9
L- I--
2.13·1O- b 1.04'10- 3I--
Expected Va1ue of TOP:
6.43'10- 9
7 5'10- 12
•
Fig. 23 Fault Tree 3. Ca1cu1ation of the Occurrence Probability of the TOP
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16
78 '- 39 - 27
246402
- 234 - 39 I- 27
"- I-
195858
- 78 93 27
~ 195858
I- 78 "- 93 I- 27
246402
L 234 "- 39 I- 27
587574
-
234 "- 93 I- 27
I- 234 "- 93 I- 27
587574
515970
I- 78 I- 245 I- 27
~~ 714987
I- 679 "- 39 I- 27
587574
I- 234 I- 93 I- 27
587574
'---- 234 I-- 93 ~ 27
-
234 I..- 245 ~ 27 1547910
1704969
"- 679 "- 93 ~ 27
I~
I- I- I- 1704969679 93 27
L- 234 I-- 245 ~ 27 1547910
I-679 245
Total Number of M.C.S.:
16
82134
884520
3581253
6505758
166355
11220036
Fig. 24 Fault Tree 3. Ca1cu1ation of the Total Number of Minimal
Cut Sets (M.C.S.),
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5. Conclus ions
The number of minimal cut sets (m.c.s.) of very comp1ex and high1y intercon-
7
nected fault trees can become extreme1y 1arge (e.g. more than 10 ). In this
case the usua1 ana1ytica1 approach of dissecting the fault tree TOP variable
into m.c.s. is not only computationa11y prohibitive1y expensive, but also
meaning1ess because it does not offer any synthetic over100k of system beha-
vior.
To emphasize this last point, a stack of paper 21 meters high wou1d be re-
quired to print out a11 m.c.s. of fault tree 3 (rv 1 1'107 m.c.s.) from
section 4. This is equiva1ent to the height of a six story bui1ding.
The above deficiencies were also pointed out in the german risk study /11/,
where simulation methods were preferred to ana1ytica1 methods.
The method suggested in this paper also overcomes the deficiencies of the
analytica1 methods. By app1ying boo1ean algebra with restricted variables
(b.a.w.r.v.), the concept of fault tree modu1arization can be straightfor-
wardly extended from a single gate to a set of gates. Thus, 1arge fault trees
are divided into sma11er fault trees (modules), which are connected to each
other according to a simple scherne. This scheme is represented by a block dia-
gram in which each block is a module. The modules are ana1yzed separate1y by
the m.c.s. method, and the results are combined according to the block diagram
connections to ca1cu1ate the occurrence probability of the TOP event.
The method offers the fol10wing advantages:
1. Ca1cu1ation of very 1arge and high1y interconnected fault trees within
a reasonable computing time.
For examp1e the CPU tirne on an IBM 3033 for the complete analysis of
the already mentioned fault tree 3 was 71 sees.
2. A synthetic overview of system behavior.
Each block of the block diagram physica11y represents a fai1ure mode
of apart of the system (subsystem). The contribution of each subsys-
tem failure mode to the occurrence probability of the TOP event can
be read from the block diagram.
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3. Calculation of the complete boolean function of the TOP variable in
a compac t form.
This is important for the following reasons:
(a) Two or more fault trees of the same system can be compared at
the boolean level in order to determine whether or not they
are identical.
The comparison among different reliability analyses of the
same system must be carried out not only at the level of pro-
babilities (as it is usually done) but also at the level of
events. In fact two TOP events, although they are different,
could have the same occurrence probability. On the other hand
two fault trees of the same system, although they look diffe-
rent, may be equal.
The problem of comparison among fault trees 1S becoming im-
portant because the confidence in the reliability analyses of
systems will increase if the analyses are carried out by dif-
ferent and independent organizations.
(b) For sensitivity studies the boolean calculation needs only be
made once. The same holds for the evaluation of the confidence
intervals of the TOP event occurrence probability.
(c) Potential application to'bn line failure diagnosis".
Here, in particular, a campiete, clear and synthetic represen-
tation of system faults is required.
The analys is of fault tree Z (section 3) with two supercomponents in cascade
has shown that the most convenient supercomponent is not always that which
has Zn states, where ri is the nurnber of gates in the selected group. Efforts
must be directed to find out mJre general rules for the definition of the
most appropriate supercomponents.
Another interesting point for further developments is the removal of logical
independence as a necessary condition for applying the method. The method being
developed at Karlsruhe handles also linear groups of gates which are weakly logically
dependent. The internal and external territories of a weakly logically dependent
group of gates are not disjoint. They have only very few components in common.
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